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If the doors of perception were cleansed every thing 
would appear to man as it is, infinite.  
(William Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, 
Plate 14) 
 
καταβατέον οὖν ὲν μέρει ἑκάστῳ είς τὴν τϖν ἂλλων 
συνοίκησιν καὶ συνεθιστέον τὰ σκοτεινὰ θεάσασθαι. 
(Plato, Republic 520c2-3)1 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper I develop a thesis about normative ethics that we might call Platonistic virtue ethics 
(PVE): Good agency in the truest and fullest sense presupposes the contemplation of the Form of 
the Good. I explore PVE as an alternative to the more familiar Aristotelian virtue ethics, asking 
what it might mean, for us to day, to do anything like contemplate "the Form of the Good". In 
particular I suggest that Iris Murdoch’s moral philosophy has at its heart a conception of 
contemplation or attention that genuinely is, as she thought it was, an inheritor of Plato’s key 









Something very familiar in contemporary moral philosophy is a view called 
Aristotelian virtue ethics, which says this: 
AVE: Right action is action in accordance with the virtues and contrary to no 
virtue. 
Compare a far less familiar view, which we might call Platonistic virtue ethics: 
                                                 
1 “Each of you in his turn must go back down to the community where the others live together, 
and learn, by practising together with them, to have contemplative understanding even of the 
things of darkness.” (PLATO, Republic 520c2-3) The (rather free) translation is my own, as are 
the other Plato translations in this paper.  
2 The present paper is substantially the text of Chapter 12 of my recent book Knowing What To 





PVE: Good agency in the truest and fullest sense presupposes the 
contemplation of the Form of the Good. 
The historical Aristotle certainly held AVE, and at times comes close to this 
very formulation (e.g. NE 1104b27, 1106a23-24). Fairly clearly the historical Plato 
likewise held PVE, at least at the time when he wrote the Republic. His clearest 
enunciation of PVE is at Republic 517 b8-c6:  
 
In the realm of the known, what is seen last of all - and with difficulty - is the 
Form of the Good. Once that is seen, we can reason about it: it is the 
explanation of all that is right and beautiful. In the visible realm, the Form of 
the Good gives birth to light and the power of light, the sun. In the intelligible 
realm, the Form of the Good is itself the power which brings about truth and 
understanding; and it is what anyone who is to act wisely (emphronôs), either 
for his own ends or for the public good, must see. 
 
PVE raises all sorts of obvious questions. Here are six of them. 
First, I call the view ‘Platonistic Virtue Ethics’. But its defining formula PVE 
does not even mention virtue. Is PVE a virtue ethics at all? 
The answer according to Plato is yes, insofar as contemplating the Form of the 
Good both causes and expresses in us the four cardinal virtues that he recognizes - 
wisdom, justice, courage, and temperance. (Though if we could confront him with 
this question, I suspect he might add that names aren’t everything, and that it isn’t 
that important how PVE is classified.) 
Secondly, PVE speaks of good agency rather than of right action. Why?  
Good, not right, in order to focus on goodness as the prior and more basic 
concept. Rightness, according to Plato, is simply perfect goodness applied to the 
world’s indefinitely many contingencies; it thus “partakes of the indefinite” in a 
way that goodness does not. Agency not action, in order to focus on characters 
rather than on single decisions. This shift of focus from deeds to doer seems 
congenial to virtue ethics, which - as has often been pointed out - is not all that 
naturally recruited into the common contemporary practice of wrangling over 
definitions of ‘the right’. 
Thirdly, it might occur to the reader that there is no reason why someone 
should not hold both PVE and AVE. I set them up as alternatives, and many 
readers will assume - contemporary philosophy rather tends to teach us to assume - 
that this means exclusive alternatives. But are these two positions really 
inconsistent? 
The answer is no, they’re not inconsistent, nor is it important that they should 
be. The proponent of PVE can affirm AVE too. The reason why he is not an 
Aristotelian virtue ethicist in AVE’s sense may only be because he doesn’t think 
AVE is where the emphasis should go. AVE is not according to him the key thing to 




say in ethics, or the thing to say if you only have time to say one thing. (Though 
why would that be?) Conversely the defender of AVE can defend PVE too: it seems 
likely to me both that Plato held AVE, and also that Aristotle held PVE (or 
something close to it that didn’t commit him to believing in Platonic Forms).  
Fourthly, PVE uses the rather weaselly phrase ‘in the truest and fullest sense’. 
What does that phrase mean? 
The idea is that agency guided by the contemplation of the Form of the Good 
is the ideal case of good agency. The thesis sets a target for good agency not a 
baseline: it defines good agency as agency that approximates that ideal, not as 
agency that surmounts this or that threshold test. (Which is not to say that there 
are no threshold tests in ethics; but if there are, they won’t be part of the definition 
of good agency.) The claim is not that contemplation is sufficient for good agency: 
of course you can engage in such contemplation and act badly, or even be a bad 
person. Nor is it that contemplation is necessary for good agency: of course you can 
act well, or even be a good person, and not be a contemplator in this sense. The 
claim, to repeat, is a target claim not a baseline claim. It is that the ideally good 
agent is a contemplator; that the closer you get to ideal goodness the closer, ceteris 
paribus, you will get to being a contemplator; and that this tells us something 
important about good agency. (But why think even that is true? Read on.) 
Fifthly, PVE uses the rather unclear word ‘presupposes’. What does this word 
mean? 
‘Presupposes’ means that the agency that PVE mentions proceeds out of, is 
caused and conditioned by, the contemplation that PVE mentions. It is, so to 
speak, the fruit of such contemplation. 
And sixthly, the biggest and most obvious question of all: what does ‘the 
contemplation of the Form of the Good’ mean? 
Undoubtedly many readers of Plato will think that this question is 
unanswerable: that there is nothing that ‘the contemplation of the Form of the 
Good’ means, or even could mean. Therefore, very probably, they will give up on 
PVE. They will conclude that PVE is unworkable, because it depends essentially on 
Plato’s incoherent notion of ‘the Form of the Good’ - an incoherence which 
naturally transmits into the incoherence of the notion of ‘the contemplation of the 
Form of the Good’. 
We might respond to this - as Plato does in works later than the Republic3 - by 
trying to develop a notion of the Form of the Good that is not only coherent but 
clearly coherent, so that it becomes a feasible basis for a view of ethics such as PVE 
                                                 
3 I would say that vindicating the Forms is at least part of Plato’s project in the Phaedrus, 
Parmenides, Theaetetus,Sophist,Philebus, and Timaeus. I cannot develop this idea here, but for a 
lot more about how it applies to the Theaetetus (and a little about the Parmenides) see my 





suggests. It is highly controversial whether Plato ever succeeded in this project, or 
succeeded in stating his central claims in a way that might command reasonable 
assent. Many contemporary scholars share Jonathan Barnes’s pessimistic 
dismissiveness: 
 
Plato’s philosophical views are mostly false, and for the most part they are 
evidently false; his arguments are mostly bad, and for the most part they are 
evidently bad. Studying Plato will indeed make you realize how difficult 
philosophy is, and the study has a particular fascination and a particular 
pleasure. But it can also be a dispiriting business: for the most part, the 
student of Plato is preoccupied by a peculiar question - How and why did 
Plato come to entertain such exotic opinions, to advance such outré 
arguments?4 
 
Whether or not we are thus pessimistic, an alternative and less metaphysically 
committing response seems attractive - seems at times to attract Plato himself. This 
alternative is to try and develop a more metaphysically modest version of PVE.  
For though Plato’s version of PVE involves him in what have seemed to many 
critics, both ancient and modern, to be hopelessly far-fetched metaphysical views, 
yet the heart of the “theory of Forms” as Plato presents it (especially in the 
Republic, Symposium, and Phaedrus)is not metaphysical or logical. It is 
experiential; and the experiences to which it appeals are meant to be possible for 
almost anyone, and actual, at least to some degree, in many of us.  
What is this, for instance, if not a description of experience? -   
 
When, therefore, a man, by means of the right sort of desire for boys, rises up 
above these particulars and begins to behold that thing The Beautiful, then he 
will almost have completed his journey. For this is the right way to be 
introduced or initiated into the science of love (ta erôtika): to start with 
particular beautiful things, but be always rising above them for the sake of 
that one Beautiful, using them like the rungs of a ladder: to move from one 
particular beautiful body to two beautiful bodies, then from two to all 
beautiful bodies; then from beautiful bodies to beautiful characters 
(epitêdeumata); then from beauty of character to the beauty of forms of 
understanding; then, finally, from these various forms of understanding to the 
                                                 
4 J. BARNES, Introduction, in: ID. (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 1995: xvi. In context, Barnes’ point is to contrast Aristotle 
favourably with Plato as thus described. The contrast doesn’t really hold up: Aristotle has 
plenty of exotic opinions and outré arguments too. 




one kind of understanding that concerns itself with nothing but the Beautiful 
Itself, in order that he may in the end know the essence of beauty5. 
 
In this narrative of ascent and elsewhere, Plato talks the way he does about 
the Forms because he takes them to be things that can be phenomenologically 
present to us: “Each of the just and unjust, good and bad, and of all the Forms... 
although it is one in itself, shows up all over the place, and appears to be many 
things, because of its communion (koinôniai) with deeds, and bodies, and the other 
Forms”6. As Plato admits in Symposium 211b-d, we experience The Beautiful, to 
kalon, only in flashes; still, there are such flashes. For Plato the Forms are things 
that we can be experientially acquainted with - and whether we realize it or not, 
quite often are. 
This point about the importance of experiential knowledge for Plato comes out 
in at least three ways in the description I quote above from Republic 517b8-c6. First 
and most patently of all, Plato’s comparison of the Form of the Good to the sun is 
expressly designed to convey to us that the Form of the Good is not just something 
that (under the right conditions, such as escape from the Cave) we can be aware of. 
It is something that (under those conditions) we can hardly help being aware of.  
Secondly, Plato introduces the comparison with the sun with a double 
reference to appearances: ta d’oun emoi phainomena houtô phainetai, “but to me at 
least, the appearances appear like this”7. How could he do more to get it across to 
us that his claim is experiential first and metaphysical, if at all, only second? 
Thirdly, note the words that I translate “Once that is seen, we can reason 
about it” (ophtheisa de syllogistea)8. Once that is seen - and not before. To repeat - 
experience comes first, metaphysics and logic second. The intellectual moves 
whereby we access the Forms are, Plato thinks, simple and easily made; in a sense, 
anyone who is minimally aware at all is already making them. The difficulty in 
getting to grasp the Forms is not a technical difficulty. It is more like a difficulty for 
one’s character.9 
It follows that a good critique of PVE should not content itself with 
metaphysical arguments alone. Here as in a number of other cases, the 
metaphysical arguments are not much more than book-keeping on the experience. 
It may happen that the metaphysical claims that a Platonist finds most natural as 
                                                 
5 PLATO, Symposium 211b6-d1. 
6 PLATO, Republic 476a2-7. 
7 Ibi, 517b8. 
8 Ibi, 517c1. 
9 “[There is a] contrast between understanding the subject and what most people want to see. 
Because of this the very things which are most obvious may become the hardest of all to 
understand. What has to be overcome is a difficulty having to do with the will rather than with 





expressions of the experience of the Forms turn out to be ontologically 
extravagant, perhaps even logically incoherent. But if that happens, the Platonist 
very probably won’t withdraw the claim that she has had the experience in the first 
place; much more likely, she will simply look for other ways of expressing that 
experience. Criticizing PVE cannot be solely about asking what adds up logically or 
metaphysically; it must also be about asking whether the Platonist’s experiential 
reports ring true.   
“Ring true for whom?” is the obvious question here. The question brings us 
back to the importance of the affective and dispositional education that is so 
painstakingly detailed by Plato in Books 2-4 of the Republic. Plato fairly obviously 
does not think that the experiential reports that someone might bring back of what 
it is like to contemplate the Form of the Good have to ‘ring true’ for just anyone at 
all. What he does think is that any reasonably well-educated person ought to be 
able to make at least some sense of at least the more modest of his claims. It will be 
easiest, of course, for those who have undergone a proper Platonic education. But 
perhaps anyone who is not hopelessly ill-conditioned can get somewhere towards 
understanding what Plato is on about when he talks about the contemplation of the 
Form of the Good, if he just starts from experiences that, we may reasonably 
assume, are perfectly familiar to him. 
So let’s try to do just that. Let us suspend, at least for the moment, PVE’s 
ambitious talk about contemplating the Form of the Good. Let us assume that we 
ourselves are not hopelessly ill-conditioned, and ask a less ambitious question. 
Suppose we adopt a position that I will call modest Platonistic virtue ethics, a 
summary statement of which can be this: -   
MPVE: Good agency in the truest and fullest sense presupposes contemplation. 
 - And suppose we then turn to the two obvious questions about MPVE: (a) 
what is contemplation? And (b) contemplation of what? I consider these questions 




Let us begin with a notion of contemplation that is perfectly familiar from our 
ordinary thinking and awareness. For this sort of contemplation, I suggest this 
simple definition: 
 
Contemplation is sustained careful intellectually honest concentration on some 
object of attention, attended to for its own sake, in order to understand it. 
 
The word “object” is crucial in this definition; contemplation is meant to be 
objectual knowledge, knowledge of objects not propositions, in action. However, 
the definition is only a starting-point. Contemplation in the present sense is 




unlikely to be captured satisfactorily just by a definition. It has a phenomenology, 
indeed a whole phenomenological profile. There’s not just ‘something it is like’ to 
contemplate, there are lots of things it is like.  
 
One central thing it is like is simply what it is like to concentrate calmly and 
steadily on study. Contemplation in this sense is something with a history, 
something humans have been doing, in one form or another, pretty well as long as 
they’ve been human. (So academics should know what I am talking about here; but 
not only them.) Here is a description of such concentration by someone who has 
herself worked as an academic, A.S. Byatt: 
 
The London Library was Roland’s favorite place.10 It was shabby but 
civilized, alive with history but inhabited also by living poets and thinkers 
who could be found squatting on the slotted metal floors of the stack, or 
arguing pleasantly at the turning of the stair. Here Carlyle had come, here 
George Eliot had progressed through the bookshelves.... The clock ticked, 
motes of dust danced in sunlight, Roland meditated on the tiresome and 
bewitching endlessness of the quest for knowledge. Here he sat, recuperating a 
dead man’s reading, timing his exploration by the library clock and the faint 
constriction of his belly. (Coffee is not to be had in the London Library.) 
...When he left, with his green and tomato boxes heaped on his Selected Ash, 
they nodded affably behind the issue desk.... He left the building as usual, his 
battered and bulging briefcase under his arm. He climbed on a 14 bus in 
Piccadilly, and went upstairs, clutching his booty. Between Piccadilly and 
Putney, where he lived in the basement of a decaying Victorian house, he 
progressed through his usual states of somnolence, sick juddering wakefulness, 
and increasing worry about Val.11 
 
I take it is no accident that Byatt begins a novel called Possession with this 
description of one kind of possession: the possession of the scholar by his research 
project. As anyone who has engaged in it will know, study or contemplation of this 
sort can indeed, as Byatt’s description brings out, be completely and hypnotically 
absorbing. It is, as Roland finds, both boring (“tiresome”) - at least to those who 
aren’t used to the long stretches of exclusive concentration on one object that it 
requires - and also (in a quiet way) exciting, “bewitching”, full of the thrill of the 
chase (cp. Socrates’ hunting cries at Rep. 432d).  
                                                 
10 On St James’s Square between Pall Mall and Piccadilly; not the same place as the British 
Library, and not, unfortunately, a free-admission library. 





On the excitement and absorption of this sort of contemplation, compare the 
opening of Bernard Lonergan’s Insight: 
 
Deep within us all, emergent when the noise of other appetites is stilled, there 
is a drive to know, to understand, to see why, to discover the reason, to find 
the cause, to explain. Just what is wanted, has many names. In what precisely 
it consists, is a matter of dispute. But the fact of inquiry is beyond all doubt. It 
can absorb a man. It can keep him for hours, day after day, year after year, in 
the narrow prison of his study or his laboratory. It can send him on dangerous 
voyages of exploration. It can withdraw him from other interests, other 
pursuits, other pleasures, other achievements. It can fill his waking thoughts, 
hide from him the world of ordinary affairs, invade the very fabric of his 
dreams. It can demand endless sacrifices that are made without regret though 
there is only the hope, never a certain promise, of success. What better symbol 
could we find for this obscure, exigent, imperious drive than a man, naked, 
running excitedly, crying, ‘I’ve got it’?12 
 
And on the elusiveness of real attentiveness cp. Bertrand Russell (talking 
about philosophical logic, but perhaps we can apply what he says more widely):  
 
The subject-matter that you are supposed to be thinking of is so exceedingly 
difficult and elusive that any person who has ever tried to think about it 
knows you do not think about it except perhaps once in six months for half a 
minute… The really good philosopher is the one who does once in six months 
manage to think about it. Bad philosophers never do.13 
 
Such study always takes place against the background of the possibility of 
distraction, and can be extremely elusive when we are not in the right state of mind 
(and body). But done right, it involves and evokes a sense of calm and focus, what 
some call a feeling of being ‘centered down’.14 It lifts us up out of ourselves, gives us 
                                                 
12 B. LONERGAN, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, University of Toronto Press, 
Toronto1957, p. 4. 
13 B. RUSSELL, Portraits From Memory And Other Essays, Simon and Schuster, New York 1956, 
p. 185. 
14 Or it can do. It can also, and indeed at the same time, be maddeningly frustrating: most of 
the time because you’re not getting anywhere, the rest of the time either because you are 
getting somewhere but much too slowly, or because you are getting somewhere, but the wrong 
somewhere.  
These reports are of course autobiographical, but it isn’t just me. "In the course of our 
conversations Russell would often exclaim: ‘Logic’s hell!’ - And this fully expresses what we 
experienced while thinking about the problems of logic; namely their immense difficulty. Their 




a sense that we are, for once in our lives, really and properly seeing at least some bit 
of reality, and seeing it as it were ‘from on high’. For this and perhaps other 
reasons, it makes us (or it can make us) very happy: the library is Roland’s favorite 
place, the place where he is happiest. As Roland also finds, such study insulates us 
and redirects us, temporarily at least, away from our own unhappiness. (Does this 
make it escapist? I’ll come back to that.) 
So much (so far) on (a) what contemplation is, on the modest understanding 
that I am recommending. What about question (b): what is Roland contemplating?  
The answer is that he is looking at the marginalia and the note-slips that a 
Victorian poet, Randolph Henry Ash, left inside his copy of Giambattista Vico’s La 
Scienza Nuova, and which have remained in the book undisturbed since Ash’s death 
until the day in 1986 when Roland opens it. Roland is about to discover something 
rather sensational inside the Vico, namely evidence that this major Victorian poet 
had a love-affair with another major poet of the time, Christabel LaMotte.15 
“But surely only a scholar could be interested in that! Surely contemplation, if 
it is to be ethically significant, has to be of something more important than long-
dead people’s private lives?” 
This objection is extremely tempting; I shall explore in the next section what 
truth there is in it. There is truth in it - some truth; but we can acknowledge that 
without missing an important possibility. This is the possibility that it might be 
good to contemplate almost anything, even something as cosmically by-the-way as 
what Roland is contemplating. There might be something to be said ethically for 
contemplating all sorts of minutiae, taking learning in all sorts of directions. At any 
rate (as they say), it keeps you off the streets; to rewrite Dr Johnson, man is never 
so innocently employed as when he is accumulating knowledge. Moreover, as T.H. 
White notes in a passage that I have loved since I was nine, all sorts of study share 
the capacity I noted in Roland’s studies, the capacity to make us happy: 
 
“The best thing for disturbances of the spirit," replied Merlin, beginning to 
puff and blow, "is to learn. That is the only thing that never fails. You may 
grow old and trembling in your anatomies, you may lie awake at night 
                                                                                                                                             
hardness - their hard & slippery texture. The primary ground of this experience, I think, was 
this fact: that each new phenomenon of language that we might retrospectively think of could 
show our earlier explanation to be unworkable. But that is the difficulty Socrates gets caught 
up in when he tries to give the definition of a concept. Again and again an application of the 
word emerges that seems not to be compatible with the concept to which other applications 
have led us. We say: but that isn’t how it is! - it is like that though! - & all we can do is keep 
repeating these antitheses." (L. WITTGENSTEIN, Culture and Value, p. 30e). 
15 Both poets are fictional, but judging by the poetic styles that Byatt forges for them, Ash is 
rather like a cross between Lord Tennyson and Robert Browning, and LaMotte rather like a 





listening to the disorder of your veins, you may miss your only love and lose 
your moneys to a monster, you may see the world about you devastated by 
evil lunatics, or know your honor trampled in the sewers of baser minds. There 
is only one thing for it then - to learn. Learn why the world wags and what 
wags it. That is the only thing which the poor mind can never exhaust, never 
alienate, never be tortured by, never fear or distrust, and never dream of 
regretting. Learning is the only thing for you. Look what a lot of things there 
are to learn - pure science, the only purity there is. You can learn astronomy in 
a lifetime, natural history in three, literature in six. And then, after you have 
exhausted a milliard lifetimes in biology and medicine and theocriticism and 
geography and history and economics, why, you can start to make a cartwheel 
out of the appropriate wood, or spend fifty years learning to begin to learn to 
beat your adversary at fencing. After that you can start again on 
mathematics, until it is time to learn to plough...”16 
 
And is the happiness brought by such variously idiosyncratic studies as Merlin 
describes here a self-indulgent, escapist happiness? Not in the book, where Merlin 
recommends learning something (anything) to his pupil, the juvenile Arthur, not as 
a form of escapism, but as a way to “pull himself together” and rise above a fit of 
self-pity. Learning can be escapist, of course; but it needn’t be. On the contrary, 
even the contemplation of idiosyncratic or “unimportant” subject-matters, like 
fencing or wheel wrighting or (some would say) philosophical logic or the private 
lives of Victorian poets, might be a form of self-discipline rather than of self-
indulgence.  
Even if such studies do involve escape, the escape in question may well be an 
ethically crucial one - the escape from the self. Iris Murdoch argues this using the 
example of learning Russian: 
 
If I am learning Russian, I am confronted by an authoritative structure which 
commands my respect. The task is difficult and the goal is distant and perhaps 
never entirely attainable. My work is a progressive revelation of something 
which exists independently of me. Attention is rewarded by a knowledge of 
reality. Love of Russian leads me away from myself towards something alien 
to me, something which my consciousness cannot take over, swallow up, deny 
or make unreal. The honesty and humility required of the student - not to 
pretend to know what one does not know - is the preparation for the honesty 
and humility of the scholar who does not even feel tempted to suppress the 
fact which damns his theory... Studying is normally an exercise of virtue as 
                                                 
16 T.H. WHITE, The Sword in the Stone, Collins, London 1938 Ch.XXI, p. 265. 




well as of talent, and shows us a fundamental way in which virtue is related to 
the real world.17 
 
The “fundamental way in which virtue is related to the real world” that 
Murdoch has in mind here is what we may call the authority of reality over the self. 
Serious, contemplative study of Russian - or of Randolph Henry Ash, or of fencing, 
or logic, or whatever - is good for the student because, as I put it above, it “lifts us 
up out of ourselves”. (Or as people say sometimes to someone preoccupied by his 
own troubles: “Come and see a film, it’ll take you out of yourself.”) Contemplation 
forces us, or perhaps I should say frees us, to recognize something objective, 
something beyond ourselves, something we cannot control, something that imposes 
the discipline of external reality on “the “fat relentless ego”18. To put it bluntly, 
this kind of contemplation, no matter what its object, does us good because it gets 
us to shut up and listen; to listen to something real outside our own heads. In this 
sense the key word in the title of an illuminating article by Mark Johnston, “The 
authority of affect”19, is, of course, authority: as much as what we emotionally feel, 
what we intellectually attend to can have a kind of normative and reason-giving 
force for us, and in the cases that interest me here, it will have this kind of 
normative force. (“Anything which alters consciousness in the direction of 
unselfishness, objectivity and realism is to be connected with virtue”20) Against the 
background of this sort of consideration, there is a certain irony to the familiar 
charge that what I am calling contemplation is escapist, or involves a flight from 
reality. On the contrary, it can be a flight to reality, and an escape from unreality. 
Nor, incidentally, need the “something real” that is contemplated be anything 
terribly intellectual; contemplation is not only for the clever. “It is so patently a 
good thing to take delight in flowers and animals that people who bring home 
potted plants and watch kestrels might be surprised at the notion that these things 
have anything to do with virtue”21. If we insist on the crude clear question “What’s 
the use of contemplation?”, and won’t accept the real answer, that it is valuable in 
its own right, still a crude clear instrumental answer is available. To put it one way, 
contemplation is good for us because it builds in us the ability to concentrate, a 
crucial prerequisite for all sorts of other ends. To put it another and slightly 
different way, contemplation is good because it focuses us, and focuses us on 
                                                 
17 I. MURDOCH, The Sovereignty of Good, London, Routledge 1970, p. 89. 
18 MURDOCH, Sovereignty, p. 58. 
19 M. JOHNSTON, The Authority of Affect, «Philosophy and Phenomenological Research», 
Vol. 63, No. 1 (Jul., 2001), pp. 181-214. 
20 MURDOCH, Sovereignty, p. 84. 





something outside ourselves. The benefit gained from the exercise does not depend 
on what that something is - as Evelyn Underhill notes: 
 
Gather yourself up, as the exercises of recollection have taught you to do. 
Then - with attention no longer frittered among the petty accidents and 
interests of your personal life, but poised, tensed, ready for the work you shall 
demand of it - stretch out by a distinct act of loving will towards one of the 
myriad manifestations of life that surround you: and which, in an ordinary 
way, you hardly notice... Pour yourself towards it, do not draw its image 
towards you. Deliberate - more, impassioned - attentiveness: this is the 
condition of success. As to the object of contemplation, it matters little. From 
Alp to insect, anything will do, provided that your attitude be right: for all 
things in this world towards which you are stretching out are linked together, 
and one truly apprehended will be the gateway to the rest.22 
 
“So contemplation in this sense can be of absolutely anything. So, can I ‘submit 
myself to the authority of reality’ by making an in-depth and detailed study of - 
hard-core pornography, or Nazi memorabilia, or excrement, or celebrity 
magazines?”  
Well actually, yes you can, provided that is really what you are doing: 
submitting yourself to the authority of reality, not pursuing some disreputable 
private obsession or getting lost in pointless, anxious, fantasy-warped trivia. I have 
not suggested for a moment that contemplation cannot be corrupted. Of course it 
can. The “frightful devious egoism of the human soul”23 is everywhere a threat to 
our efforts to make genuine contact with realities outside our selves. At every turn 
it directs us away from the shock of the real, back towards the comforts of illusion, 
fantasy, and private obsession that we nurture within ourselves. We feel uneasy 
with the investigator of Nazi memorabilia, or porn, or excrement, because we worry 
that we are in the presence, not of the liberating quest for truth, but of a self-
serving and degrading fetish. (It is because the necrophiliac Leontius son of Aglaion 
knows perfectly well that he is a fetishist that he despises himself24) 
Yet even investigations into the lowest and “dirtiest” things - and surely 
“dirtiness” is a concept we obviously need to outgrow25 - even investigations like 
                                                 
22 E. UNDERHILL, Mysticism: A Study in the Nature and Developments of Man’s Spiritual 
Consciousness, 12th ed., New York, Meridian, 1955, pp. 93-4. 
23 I. MURDOCH, Existentialists and Mystics. Writings on Philosophy and Literature, Chatto & 
Windus 1997, p. 401. 
24 PLATO, Republic 439e. 
25 Mt 15.11: “Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a man.” Simone Weil: “La pureté 
est le pouvoir de contempler la souillure.” S. WEIL, La pesanteur et la grâce, Paris, Plon 1947, p. 
200. 




these can be conducted in a pure spirit of inquiry.26 It is an important point about 
science in general that it too involves this kind of contemplative attention to things 
as they are in themselves. Most people seem to think that the question about 
“science and humane values” is the question how humane values can possibly be 
justified, against the starkly inhumane perspective that science affords. Perhaps 
part of the answer to this familiar difficulty is just to come to a better appreciation 
of the ways in which the practice of science itself is an expression of and response to 
one of the deepest humane values of all - the value of contemplation that I have 
been discussing.  
I will say a little more about science at the end. For now, let me just add this. 
One of the hallmarks of modern philosophy, by which I mean roughly philosophy 
since Bacon and Hobbes, is that it takes the world to be made of what the 
contemporary libertarian (and very Hobbesian) consequentialist Jan Narveson 
likes to call “just stuff”:27 value-neutral matter in space. If there is value, it is 
routinely assumed, it must lie somewhere else than just in the stuff; indeed, given 
the priority of ‘stuff’ in our world-view, there is bound to be a problem about fitting 
value into a world of neutral stuff. Even if we are deep-green environmental 
philosophers - the usual story is - we cannot coherently assume that everything is 
valuable; there is easy if cheap sport to be had - perhaps in the first lecture of a 
first-year undergraduate course - in mocking anyone who starts from that rapidly-
discarded assumption. (“So you think that stones have rights?”, etc.; as if, for 
anything to have value, it must have it in the way that humans have value.) 
Yet the most striking thing about this now-universally-mocked assumption is 
that for hundreds and hundreds of years it is what pretty well everybody thought. 
At the very least from Augustine (de Libero Arbitrio Book 1) to Aquinas (omneens 
est bonum quoad ens, ST 1a.49.3), it was a close to universal consensus among Latin 
philosophers that existence as such was good, and therefore that anything that 
existed was good - at least to the extent that it existed, though possibly not much 
further. (The doctrine that existence in general as such is good does not entail that 
it cannot ever be better on balance that some particular thing not exist.) I want to 
suggest that it is this metaphysical outlook that gives its grounding to the idea that 
anything at all, however humble, can be a proper object of contemplation. The 
reason why everything that exists is worth (at least some) contemplative attention 
is because there is a sense in which everything that exists is good.  
Undoubtedly, today, most philosophers, and probably most people - most of 
the time - have lost their grip on such ideas. One way to breathe new philosophical 
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reminds us: see Davies’ The Rebel Angels (London: Penguin, 1981), pp. 106-8. 
27 I don’t know whether Narveson uses this phrase in his writings; he certainly used it - a lot - in 





life into the Thomist thesis omne ens est bonum quoad ens might be to borrow a move 
from Thomas Nagel. Nagel famously argues (1979) that since it is impossible to 
explain how mind might have emerged from matter, and since it is clear that mind 
does now exist, the only coherent way to explain mind’s existence now is to adopt 
the panpsychist view that mind has been present in matter all along. Maybe we 
should make out a parallel argument about value. 
Outside philosophy, there are places in our culture where the idea of goodness 
in everything still seems alive, at least at a subliminal level. I think poetry may be 
one such place; at least poetry as practiced by those poets who find epiphany in 
even the smallest things, such as Louis Macneice, Norman MacCaig, Seamus 
Heaney, sometimes Philip Larkin. Perhaps Simone Weil agrees:  
 
Le poète produit le beau par l’ attention fixée sur du réel. De même l’ acte de l’ 
amour. Savoir que cet homme, qui a faim et soif, existe vraiment autant que 
moi - cela suffit, le reste suit de lui-même.28 
 
We might, if we are theists, go even further, and suggest that everything that 
exists is not only good, but good because it is charged with the presence of God. 
That suggestion will certainly be made by Augustine and Aquinas - and by Evelyn 
Underhill and Simone Weil. Also by Thomas Traherne: 
 
Your enjoyment of the World is never right, till you so esteem it, that 
everything in it, is more your treasure than a King’s exchequer full of Gold 
and Silver. And that exchequer yours also in its place and service. Can you 
take too much joy in your Father’s works? He is Himself in everything. Some 
things are little on the outside, and rough and common, but I remember the 
time when the dust of the streets were as pleasing as Gold to my infant eyes, 
and now they are more precious to the eye of reason... You never enjoy the 
world aright, till you see how a sand exhibited the wisdom and power of God: 
And prize in everything the service which they do you, by manifesting His 
glory and goodness to your Soul.29 
                                                 
28 WEIL, La Pesanteur et la Grâce,p. 196: “The poet produces the beautiful by fixing his 
attention on the real. Just so does the act of love. To know that this man, who is hungry and 
thirsty, really exists, just as much as I do - that is enough. The rest follows of its own accord.” 
29 T. TRAHERNE, Centuries of Meditations, New York, Cosimo Classics 1909, 1.25, 27. Cp. the 
opening of William Blake’s Auguries of Innocence:  
“To see a world in a grain of sand / 
And a heaven in a wild flower, / 
Hold infinity in the palm of your hand, / 
And eternity in an hour”. 





If these theists are right, then underneath all our other attitudes to the world 
around us should lie awe and wonder. For such theists, the most foundational 
reason why reverence is indeed a virtue - and why glory is a value30 - is because the 
Real Presence is everywhere, and there is nowhere in the world to which Jacob’s 
marvelous words in Genesis 28.17 do not apply: “God is here, and I wist it not. How 





And so we come to Murdoch. The Sovereignty of Good is one of the few modern 
expositions of a Platonistic view of ethics; it is Iris Murdoch’s clearest and most 
concentrated attempt to offer such a view, and to offer it with at least a degree of 
metaphysical modesty. So it will be worth fairly close attention in what follows.  
In line with her (relative) metaphysical modesty, Murdoch offers a 
‘demythologised’ reading of Plato’s cave: as a story about liberation from the 
illusions of the self. That liberation happens as we come into clearer and more 
comprehending contact with realities outside ourselves, things which have a life and 
a being of their own that we cannot manipulate to our own egotistical purposes, but 
have to respect as existing in their own right, quite independently of us. 
 
The self, the place where we live, is a place of illusion. Goodness is connected 
with the attempt to see the unself,32 to see and to respond to the real world in 
the light of a virtuous consciousness. This is the non-metaphysical meaning of 
the idea of transcendence to which philosophers have so constantly resorted in 
their explanations of goodness. “Good is a transcendent reality” means that 
virtue is the attempt to pierce the veil of selfish consciousness and join the 
                                                                                                                                             
The parallel is all the more remarkable given that neither author can have known the other’s 
work: Traherne’s writings were completely forgotten until 1909, and indeed Auguries of 
Innocence was only published posthumously, in 1863. (Nor then can Dostoevsky’s Father 
Zosima, as quoted above, be alluding to either passage.) Perhaps Psalm 139.17-18 stands behind 
all three passages: “How precious also are thy thoughts unto me, O God! how great is the sum of 
them! If I should count them, they are more in number than the sand.” 
30 See T. CHAPPELL, Glory as an ethical idea, «Philosophical Investigations», Special Issue: 
Ethics and Religion, Volume 34, Issue 2, pages 105–134, April 2011. 
31 TRAHERNE, Centuries of Meditations, 1.31. 
32 One wonders if this nonce-word has an argument packed into it: maybe Murdoch is 
suggesting that “being unselfconscious” is or can be not merely lack of consciousness of self, but 





world as it really is. It is an empirical fact about human nature that this 
attempt cannot be entirely successful.33 
 
Like arguing for the Forms in the Phaedo (73c-d), “joining the world as it 
really is” is a task that can take any part of reality as its point of departure. It is 
not, so far forth, important whether it is the study of fencing or Russian or indeed 
of anything else that happens to engage our interest. Provided we attempt to 
submit to the “authority of reality” in whatever area of study we do choose, we can 
still learn the same sort of lessons about self-disciplined attentiveness and looking 
beyond our own private obsessions and fantasies - lessons, that is, about the value 
of truth and objectivity, which as Murdoch rightly stresses are morally crucial 
lessons. 
But I say ‘so far forth’ because, obviously, this can’t be the whole of the story. 
If you like, this is only the centrifugal half of it, and there is a centripetal half as 
well. Suppose someone was only interested in his contemplation of Randolph Henry 
Ash, or Russian, or Homer (either one), or logic - and in nothing else. No matter 
how pure and unselfish his submission to the “authority of reality” in his area of 
study, such a person is plainly criticisable. However much his work has taught him 
about the value and importance of the humble pursuit of truth in that area, it 
seems not to have taught him that there are some subjects for contemplation that 
everybody should take an interest in.  
“Joining the world as it really is” necessarily involves recognizing that, even if 
everything is interesting, still it is part of the way the world “really is” that some 
things are more important, and so more worthy of contemplation, than others. 
Under this heading Murdoch notes three things, or kinds of thing, in particular. The 
first is other people; the second is beauty; the third is what she calls “the Good”. 
My project here is to try and make sense of Platonistic virtue ethics in the 
most metaphysically modest way possible. So - at least first time round - I will 
consider the third of these possible objects of contemplation, “the Good”, only 
briefly. Murdoch says this about it:  
 
I think there is a place both inside and outside religion for a sort of 
contemplation of the Good, not just by dedicated experts but by ordinary 
people; an attention which is not just the planning of particular good actions 
but an attempt to look right away from self towards a distant transcendent 
perfection, a source of uncontaminated energy, a source of new and quite 
undreamt-of virtue. This attempt, which is a turning of attention away from 
the particular, may be the thing that helps most when difficulties seem 
insoluble, and especially when feelings of guilt keep attracting the gaze back 
                                                 
33 MURDOCH, Sovereignty, p. 93. 




towards the self. This is the true mysticism which is morality, a kind of 
undogmatic prayer which is real and important, though perhaps also difficult 
and easily corrupted.34 
 
What, we might ask, can Murdoch have in mind here? What is ‘the Good’ that 
she wants us to contemplate? Does she mean the quality of goodness, in things or 
people? Or particular paradigm cases of goodness? Or neither - but if neither, then 
what else? Murdoch herself is frank about the difficulty of speaking clearly about 
“the Good”: even goodness, never mind “the Good”, is “rare and hard to picture”35. 
She notes, too, the indefinability of “the Good”36: “a genuine mysteriousness 
attaches to the idea of goodness and the Good”. So in his different way does Plato 
(the Form of the Good is “over beyond Being”, epekeina tês ousias37). 
Since what she calls “the Good” is both “a distant transcendent perfection”, 
and also “a source of uncontaminated energy”, “the Good” sounds really very like 
God - a resemblance that Murdoch does not always try very hard to deny. “That 
God, attended to, is a powerful source of (often good) energy is a psychological 
fact”38. Murdoch wants to say that contemplating the Good can have the same 
power whether or not we are, as they say, “realists about religion”: 
 
Prayer is properly not petition, but simply an attention to God which is a form 
of love... God [is] a single perfect transcendent non-representable and necessarily 
real object of attention... moral philosophy should attempt to retain a central 
concept which has all those characteristics.39 
 
On the other hand, Murdoch also thinks that there is a possible move from the 
experienced reality of a necessary convergence-point of all claims about the good to 
claims about God’s actual existence. This is what she means by “the ontological 
argument”. (She says more about these ideas in Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals 
than in Sovereignty.)  
In truth it might be easier to understand what Murdoch says here if we knew 
that she was talking about God. It is certainly less difficult to see how the God of 
traditional Judaeo-Christian theology, given that he is personal, could be this sort 
of originating force, this creative power of goodness, this ideal limit of longing, than 
could anything different from God that we might call ‘the Good’. It is also, perhaps, 
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clearer how God might be an object of contemplation than ‘the Good’. We might 
add that, at least in traditional theology, contemplating God is contemplating the 
Good, though the converse is not so obviously true. 
So what Murdoch has to say about this third object of contemplation, ‘the 
Good’, is decidedly obscure. Perhaps some light will be shed on it too in the end, if 
we turn first to Murdoch’s two other types of object of contemplation, beauty and 




“The appreciation of beauty,” Murdoch says, “is not only (for all its difficulties) the 
easiest available spiritual exercise; it is also a completely adequate entry into (and 
not just analogy of) the good life, since it is the checking of selfishness in the 
interest of seeing the real”40. Murdoch’s most famous example of what she means 
about how beauty acts on us is the hawk: 
 
I am looking out of my window in an anxious and resentful state of mind, 
oblivious of my surroundings, brooding perhaps on some damage done to my 
prestige. Then suddenly I observe a hovering kestrel. In a moment everything 
is altered. The brooding self with its hurt vanity has disappeared. There is 
nothing now but kestrel.41 
 
The touchstone of such an experience is, as before, its contact with reality: in it 
we see, we experience, what is really there, outside and beyond ourselves. But that 
can happen - as we saw in the last section - in the contemplation of anything at all. 
So what makes the experience of beauty special?  
I suspect Murdoch’s idea - here as elsewhere following Simone Weil - is that 
there is no clear boundary separating off the experience of the beautiful from the 
experience of any other reality. (If we accept the all-inclusive axiology of the last 
section, the absence of any such boundary is exactly what we will expect.)It is just 
that in the case of beauty our experience is abnormally sharp, and accompanied by 
a particularly strong and clear response of delight and wonder. In such an 
experience as Murdoch describes, you don’t just see the kestrel. You really see it; 
you see it properly, so properly that what drops out of awareness is not the kestrel 
but yourself.  
As suggested at the end of the last section, there can be a convergence between 
loving beauty and loving the world; the omega-point of that convergence is the 
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affirmation that the world as a whole is beautiful.42 Something like the same 
convergence seems to be in Dostoevsky’s mind when he has Father Zosima tell us to  
 
love all God’s creation, the whole and every grain of sand in it. Love every 
leaf, every ray of God’s light. Love the animals, love the plants, love 
everything. If you love everything, you will perceive the divine mystery in 
things.43 
 
Perhaps something similar is going on in two other familiar forms of 
engagement with nature: bird-watching and mountaineering, at least when the 
birds, or mountains, are approached for their own sake and not out of mere 
competitiveness or list-ticking. Unfortunately it is more usual for us to fail to see or 
hear properly what is right in front of us, because of the white noise of our own 
little obsessions, the constant nagging and fidgeting of the ego: “Suppression of self 
is required before accurate vision can be obtained”44. 
In our society, contemplative devotion to nature is in fact a remarkably 
widespread phenomenon; indeed it is much more widespread than is any sense of 
how such devotion might be justified. Nothing is more usual than to hear devotion 
for nature dismissed as mere sentimentality, as opposed to the hard-nosed concern 
for financial gain that is displayed by, for example, those who like to call 
themselves “developers”, and who, a Martian might be forgiven for concluding, are 
currently being encouraged by the British government to destroy as much of the 
British countryside as soon as they can.  
If I am right, there is nothing necessarily sentimental about the contemplative 
exploration of nature that so many people in our culture unselfconsciously engage 
in. If it comes to accusing others of irrational attachments, perhaps the 
attachments to money and to busy acquisitiveness that are also so characteristic of 
our society should be a little more steadily scrutinized and criticized. 
The third type of object of contemplation that I noted was other people. (Or 
perhaps we should just say ‘people’, since I am after all a person myself, and a 
                                                 
42 As a - perhaps unexpected - witness to this, see now Jerry Cohen (2012: 207): “What one 
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counterexample machine. But I think Pissarro’s statement is defensible. Hegel said that in old 
age we see the good in everything. Old analytical philosophers should understand when not to 
use the counterexample machine.”  
43 F. DOSTOEVSKY, The Brothers Karamazov, Great Books, Chicago 1952, p. 167. 





person of whom I particularly need a just and loving view. However the first-
personal case introduces special complications, so for the moment I will stick with 
‘other people’.) Here Murdoch says this: 
 
The more the separateness and differentness of other people is realized, and the 
fact seen that another man has needs and wishes as demanding as one’s own, 
the harder it becomes to treat a person as a thing...45 
 
(Compare, once more, Traherne, Centuries 1.39: “Your enjoyment is never 
right, till you esteem every soul so great a treasure as our Saviour doth: and that 
the laws of God are sweeter than the honey and honeycomb because they command 
you to love them all in such perfect manner. For... are they not the riches of his 
love?”)  
Both with our awareness of beauty and with our awareness of other people, the 
crucial thing that they teach us is a certain kind of purification of vision and 
imagination: we learn how to see them, and we learn how to think about them. Part 
of what it might mean to say, with MPVE, that “good agency in the truest and 
fullest sense presupposes contemplation”, is that the question of virtuous action 
does not even arise until this purification of vision has happened.  
Or rather, begun to happen, because the process of purifying one’s vision is 
endlessly perfectible, and always incomplete. The activity of seriously and non-self-
indulgently contemplating beauty or other people is hard, because it forces us to 
simplify ourselves, so long as we continue to contemplate, into nothing but still and 
undivided contemplaters: to concentrate our minds upon something single and 
different from ourselves. (Kierkegaard: “Purity of heart is to will one thing.”) And 
this is a hard thing for human beings to do, both because “human kind,” in Eliot’s 
famous words, “cannot bear very much reality” (the difficulty of concentrating 
again), and also because this sort of externally-directed attentiveness involves a 
kind of self-sacrifice. As Murdoch notes, somewhat ruefully, with an 
autobiographical eye on the difficulties of the novelist (difficulties which I fear her 
own novels as often succumb to as solve): 
 
“The progress of an artist is a continual self-sacrifice, a continual extinction of 
personality” [T.S.Eliot, “Tradition and the individual talent”]. This is 
perfectly true. Art is not an expression of personality, it is a question rather of 
the continual expelling of oneself from the matter in hand. Anyone who has 
attempted to write a novel will have discovered this difficulty in the special 
form which it takes when one is dealing with fictitious characters. Is one going 
to be able to present any character other than oneself who is more than a 
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conventional puppet? How soon one discovers that, however much one is in 
the ordinary sense ‘interested in other people’, this interest has left one far 
short of possessing the knowledge required to create a real character who is not 
oneself. It is impossible, it seems to me, not to see one’s failure here as a sort of 
spiritual failure... Virtue is not essentially or immediately concerned with 
choosing between actions or rules or reasons, nor with stripping the personality 
for a leap. It is concerned with really apprehending that other people exist.46 
 
The point of MPVE’s focus upon attentiveness is not to deny that good agency 
matters at all, or to say that the only thing that matters is having our moral vision 
and imagination purified in this way. But it is to say that good agency is necessarily 
dependent upon good moral vision: “Of course virtue is good habit and dutiful 
action. But the background condition of such habit and such action, in human 
beings, is a just mode of vision and a good quality of consciousness”47. It is also to 
say that moral vision is itself a morally central activity. 
 
Is there not also a good constructive imagination which plays an important 
part in our life? Imagining is doing, it is a sort of personal exploring... This 
activity is, moreover, usually and often inevitably, an activity of evaluation. 
We evaluate not only by intentions, decisions, choices… but also, and largely, 
by the constant quiet work of attention and imagination. The image here is 
not so much that of a body moving... but rather of a sort of seeping of color, or 
the setting up of a magnetic field... We are obscure to ourselves because the 
world we see already contains our values and we may not be aware of the slow 
delicate processes of imagination and will which have put those values there.48 
 
Perhaps it will help to consider some examples of this activity of imagining, 
and of “the constant quiet work of attention”, as it applies to other people. 
Murdoch’s own example, which she develops in detail and at length, is the famous 
case of D and M (Sovereignty pp.16-23), in which the mother (M), by sympathetic 
engagement with and attention to the reality of a daughter-in-law (D) whom she 
finds unattractive in some important ways, learns to see her more truly and more 
generously. But that case is, perhaps, over-familiar by now; there are many other 
cases that deserve equally detailed consideration. Here are two. 
First, sticking with parent-child relations, think of a parent who is trying to 
work out how to advise her uncertain daughter which courses to take at university. 
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To do this well she needs to bring to bear all she has learned over eighteen years or 
so about her daughter’s abilities, what she will probably enjoy, what she probably 
really wants - if there is a fact of the matter about that. All the parent’s 
deliberations about what to say to her undecided daughter are, and are quite 
properly, subject to the uncertainty of the future, and to the need to allow the 
daughter enough autonomy to, as they say, “make her own mistakes”; balanced no 
doubt by the very parental worry that mistaken life-choices, especially at eighteen, 
can be hauntingly costly and adhesive. (Here perhaps the parent remembers some 
of her own mistakes.) Above all, the parent’s deliberations are constrained by the 
fact that the choice cannot be simply made by inference from premises about the 
daughter’s character. At eighteen, barely out of school, her character is not yet 
fully formed. Its full formation is precisely what is in question, and one of the 
things to which the parent most needs to give her careful attention. (I think it 
comes out here that Heidegger has a term in his lexicon that corresponds quite 
closely to Murdoch’s “loving truthful attention”; it is Sorge.)49 
For a second example, consider an episode from Heinrich Böll’s Irish Journal. 
As it is not all that well-known, I need to quote it at some length: 
 
I found on the pews what I found in lots of Irish churches, little enamel 
plaques that exhorted to prayer: Pray for the soul of Michael O’Neill, who died, 
aged 60, on 17 January 1933; Pray for the soul of Mary Keegan, who died, aged 
18, on 9 May 1945. The deft, pious blackmail: the dead became alive, their 
death-date entwined itself, for whoever read the little tablets, with his own 
experience that day, that month, that year. Hitler with his twitching face 
waited for power, while here Michael O’Neill died, aged 60. As Germany 
capitulated, Mary Keegan died, aged 18. Pray (I read) for Kevin Cassidy, who 
died, aged 13, on December 20 1930 - and this hit me like an electric shock, 
because in December 1930 I was 13 too. In a big, dark flat in the south of the 
city of Cologne - what in 1908 had been called “an exclusive apartment” - I 
squatted with my Christmas-communion certificate in my hand; the holidays 
had begun, and through a worn patch in the cinnamon-colored curtain, I could 
see the wintry street below...  
On this day, then, Kevin Cassidy died in Dublin, 13 years old, as old as I was 
at the time: here his tomb was made ready, the Dies Irae sung below the organ 
loft, Kevin’s dazed schoolfellows filled the pews; incense, the heat of candles, 
silver tassels on a black shroud; while I folded up my communion certificate 
and got the toboggan out of the closet to go for a sledge. I got a B in Latin, 
and Kevin’s coffin sank into the grave. 
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Later, when I had left the church and was walking through the streets, Kevin 
Cassidy still walked alongside me; I saw him alive and as old as myself, for 
seconds I saw myself as Kevin Cassidy at 37: he was a father of three and lived 
in the slums around St Patrick’s; the whiskey was bitter and cool and 
expensive, the ice in it was shot from Swift’s grave; his dark-haired wife’s face 
was pale-green, he had debts and a little house like countless ones in London 
and thousands in Dublin, humble, two-storey, poor; petit-bourgeois, stuffy, 
hopeless is what the incorrigible aesthete would call it (but careful, aesthete: 
James Joyce was born in one of these houses, and Sean O’Casey in another). 
So near was Kevin’s shade that I ordered two whiskeys when I went back into 
the drinking dive. But the ghost would not lift the glass to his lips, so I drank 
myself for Kevin Cassidy who died, aged 13, on 20 December 1930 - I drank for 
him, and with him.50 
 
Böll, pricked into reaction and empathy by the coincidence of his own age with 
the unknown Kevin Cassidy’s, shows us with precision and eloquence what it is like 
to think your way into someone else’s life when that someone has died. We can of 
course do more than think about others as dead (even if they are). We can wonder 
as Böll does how it would feel to occupy that person’s position in the world; what 
you would see and smell and hear and otherwise sense from there. (Never mind 
“What is it like to be a bat?”; the prior, perhaps even harder, exercise for us is 
“What is it like to be someone else?”51)  
By this creative, but also truth-seeking, activity of mind and feeling, one 
learns to see what others see, to understand what it was like for others to choose, 
and hence how and why those others did choose as they in fact chose. Amongst 
other things one gets, by this sort of application of the moral imagination, the 
beginnings of a sense of how they might have chosen: what potential there was in 
their situations for creativity and imaginativeness, what really good choices in those 
situations might have been like, and also - with pity and compassion - what choices 
were impossible for them. Such understanding is, as Peter Goldie has well argued, 
essentially narrative in its structure, yet essentially not understanding of something 
that is essentially narrative in its structure.52 
Despite her obvious and avowed love of detail and multiplicity, Murdoch says 
that attention to others of this sort is a unifying form of understanding. 
                                                 
50 H. BÖLL, Ein Irisches Tagebuch, München, Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag 1961, pp. 25-7, my 
own translation. (It apparently exists in English as well, but I’ve only seen the original.) 
51 Not to mention “What is it like to be me?” But as before, the first-personal case raises special 
difficulties that I won’t try to resolve here. 
52 See P. GOLDIE, The Mess Inside, Oxford, Oxford UP 2012, Chapter 4, Section 2, 





(“Reflection rightly tends to unify the moral world”53) “A unifying form of 
understanding” is an ambiguous phrase, but maybe both sides of the ambiguity 
hold good: when I engage in such attention it tends to psychologically unify me, the 
attender, and it also tends to conceptually unify what I am attending to. Learning 
to respond appropriately to any particular phenomenon or experience means 
learning a kind of responsiveness that will be applicable to all sorts of phenomena 
and experiences; to understand what kinds of goodness are possible in different 
situations, you need to understand as much as you can about both goodness and 
possibility in general. Learning this kind of responsiveness and understanding is, to 
use Murdoch’s own phrase, a “limitless task”, because the possibilities that the 




Imaginative exercises like the ones I have just described are part of what is 
involved in coming to an ethically adequate understanding of that part of the 
reality outside us that is other people. Something analogous is involved in the 
imaginative explorations that natural beauty might evoke in us.  
Such imaginative explorations of natural beauty, or of what it is like to be 
other people, are interesting for many reasons. One obvious reason is because they 
also happen in our responses to art too. To look - to really look - at a great painting 
or piece of music is (or can be) to contemplate it with just the sort of stillness and 
inner undividedness that I describe above; to engage with a play or a novel is (or 
can be) just the kind of imaginative activity I have described, of thinking one’s way 
through what it is like to be the character in the fiction, and what that character 
might do, by exploring the possibilities for goodness for that character.  
Imagination is a kind of freedom, a renewed ability to perceive and express 
truth... The artist must tell the truth about something which he has understood... 
In the case of fiction the subject-matter is, usually... individual people... Other 
people are, after all, the most interesting features of our world and in some ways the 
most poignantly and mysteriously alien. Literature tells us things and teaches us 
things. In portraying characters the author displays most clearly his discernment, 
his truthfulness, his justice, or his lack of these qualities, and one of our enjoyments 
lies in considering and judging his judgments. The highest pleasures of literature 
and, one might say, of art generally, are in this sense moral pleasures54. 
Plato contrasted the true objective vision of the philosopher, which enables us 
really to see the Form of the Good, aside from all distractions, with the deceptive 
pseudo-objectivity of art, which at best tricks us into thinking we see goodness. 
                                                 
53 MURDOCH, Sovereignty, p. 57. 
54 MURDOCH, Existentialists and Mystics, p. 257. 




Murdoch of course agrees with Plato that art can present us with falsehoods and 
unrealities. But she thinks that that happens not when art is functioning as it 
should, but when it malfunctions - when the artist is dragged away from trying to 
capture how things really are, and sidelined into mere fantasizing. For her Plato’s 
contrast between philosophy and art transmutes into a distinction between a kind 
of true objective vision and a kind of deceptive pseudo-objectivity, both of which 
are available in both art and philosophy. Artists and philosophers alike can submit 
to the discipline of trying to make sense of what is actually there, in all its chaos 
and complication - and all its strange beauty; or they can insist on imposing the 
pattern that they find comforting and convenient (or as is also possible, stylish and 
impressive). The latter way is objectionable because it is dishonest: whether 
through affectation,55 falseness of vision, laziness or sloppiness, or some other cause, 
it does not work hard enough at the “endless task” of engaging with reality. But 
when art does succeed in encountering and capturing what is really there, then 
contemplating art teaches us just as much about reality as purely philosophical 
contemplation can; for most people, indeed, probably more. 
 
Good art reveals what we are usually too selfish and too timid to recognize, the 
minute and absolutely random detail of the world, and reveals it together with 
a sense of unity and form. This form often seems to us mysterious because it 
resists the easy patterns of the fantasy, whereas there is nothing mysterious 
about the forms of bad art since they are the recognizable and familiar rat-runs 
of selfish day-dream. Good art shows us how difficult it is to be objective by 
showing us how differently the world looks to an objective vision. We are 
presented with a truthful image of the human condition in a form which can be 
steadily contemplated; and indeed this is the only context in which many of us 





At the end of Section III above, I noted that Murdoch sees three kinds of thing 
as particularly important objects of contemplation: beauty (or the world, if the 
                                                 
55 A nice example of aversion to affectation in imagining: “In his memoir Experience, Martin 
Amis recalls his father, Kingsley, saying that he found Virginia Woolf’s fictional world ‘wholly 
contrived: when reading her he found that he kept interpolating hostile negatives, murmuring 
“Oh no she didn’t” or “Oh no he hadn’t” or “Oh no it wasn’t” after each and every authorial 
proposition’” (quoted in N. HORNBY, The Complete Polysyllabic Spree, Penguin, London 2007, p. 
95). 





whole world is beautiful), other people, and “the Good”. And I suggested that, since 
the third of these objects is decidedly mysterious, at least at first sight, we should 
look first at the other two objects of contemplation, and see if doing so shed any 
light on what it might be to engage in what Murdoch clearly thinks is the most 
important form of “just and loving attention” of all: to contemplate ‘the Good’. So, 
has any light been shed? 
Perhaps it has. Looking in particular at the two passages from Murdoch that I 
have just quoted in the last section, the obvious suggestion as to what 
contemplating “the Good” is takes us to a second-order activity. In contemplating 
beauty, or other people, in the ways described in Sections IV-V - or for that matter, 
in contemplating the other multiplicity of possible objects of contemplation that we 
considered in Section II - we always contemplate them in the light of standards: most 
obviously, the standards of truth, justice, and love. Now we might also come to 
contemplate those standards themselves; we might even come to think of them as 
all being emanations or aspects of one single all-embracing standard, and make that 
the object of our contemplation. Wouldn’t this be a description of what it might be 
to contemplate “the Good”? (Compare the way in which Plato’s philosopher, once 
released from the Cave, looks around the upper world by the light of the sun, and 
only once he can do that, learns to look at the sun itself: Republic 515e-516c.) I 
think this is pretty clearly what Murdoch must mean by her talk about 
contemplating the Good: she means a steady reflective gaze directed not merely 
upon the things that we judge by the standards of love, truthfulness, and justice, 
but upon those standards themselves.  
I think this interpretation makes Murdoch’s version of Platonistic virtue ethics 
both metaphysically modest, and also intelligible. However, even in this “cleaned-
up” version, there are doubtless criticisms of the view that we should take seriously. 
Here is one: for my own part, I find that I can do less with the idea of 
contemplating the Good itself in this sense, as it were “all on its own”, than I can 
with the idea of applying the Good to particular cases. To use an example that I 
introduced above, I can see what it would be like to consider how to advise my 
daughter on a choice of university course in the light of the standards of love, 
truthfulness, and justice. (As quite often with Murdoch’s rather fulsome 
formulations, this may sound a bit high-faluting, but it is really just a matter of 
asking questions like: Would course X really ‘be her’? Have I the right to push her 
towards course Y instead, when she says that’s not what she wants to do but my 
knowledge of her suggests she is mistaken about what she wants? How far should I 
let her make her own mistakes? - And so on; all of them vitally necessary questions, 
none of them definitively answerable.) Or to use one of Murdoch’s examples from 
fiction, I can see what it would be to consider, say, Petya Rostov in the light of 
those standards. (It would be to ask questions like: Does Tolstoy picture him with 
full realism? Is he a character we can believe in? Is he someone we find attractive 




and interesting? Does Tolstoy succeed in making his fictional existence matter? - To 
all of which questions, my own answer is a resounding Yes.)  
It seems to me that we only get a clear grip on what talk about ‘the Good’ 
might mean when we are considering how “the Good” might be applied to 
contemplating specific cases like these. I am far from sure what I would be doing if 
I tried to consider ‘the Good ‘in itself’, and apart from such specifics. In a 
meditative response to (say) War and Peace, there is a back-and-forth movement 
between thoughts of the form “The depiction of Petya is thus and so, therefore 
meets (or fails to meet) the standard of the Good” and thoughts of the form “Yes, 
he is shown like that, but that’s not what it is to meet the standard of the Good; 
rather, what the Good demands is this...” - an interchange, that is, between 
thoughts about how to apply the concept of the Good, and thoughts about how to 
characterize that concept. To me at any rate, both sides of this interchange seem 
essential to understanding what the Good is, and indeed to contemplating it. One 
moves ‘up the ladder’, from the particular to the general; but one also moves ‘down 
the ladder’, from the general to particular. For me at any rate, there is no 
understanding without both movements. 
Perhaps a Platonist of Murdoch’s sort will not disagree. But if not, then surely 
we have given up the last vestige of what seems to be Plato’s idea, in the Republic, 
that the contemplation of the Good itself, all on its own, is somehow the acme and 
the goal of contemplation. What we have instead is the idea that the Good is 
interesting because it is both necessarily separate from the world, and also 
necessarily involved with it. There again, when we remember the famous line about 
the philosopher’s redescent from Republic 520c2 - καταϐατέονοὖν - perhaps we will 
conclude that this conjunction of necessary separation and necessary involvement 





In this last section I consider an objection to MPVE. The objection is this. 
Murdoch talks about love, and about contemplation of the Good, as being all about 
“the discovery of reality”57. But what if the ‘reality’ that is actually there to 
discover is not what she thinks it is, but the cold emptiness of ‘atoms and the void’ 
that other philosophers, Democritus and some modern physicalists for instance, 
have taken reality to be? Or what, alternatively, if the ‘reality’ that is actually 
there to discover is such that the appropriate response to it is not wonder, 
fascination, delighted curiosity, as Murdoch and I think, but boredom and 
contempt - as Sartre and Camus perhaps think? 
                                                 






The second of these what-ifs is more swiftly dealt with, for the simple reason 
that almost no one seriously thinks this. (Not even teenagers. Perhaps not even 
gloomy French existentialists - not really.) Of course some things in the world are, 
at some level and from some vantage-point, boring or contemptible or both: Mein 
Kampf, for instance, or the minutes of 30 years’ worth of Ku Klux Klan meetings. 
But the idea that the world overall is boring and/or contemptible, while it is hard to 
see what an argument against it would look like, does seem to fail the test of 
experience. It just seems empirically mistaken - mistaken in a way that experience 
of the world overall can very quickly falsify - and moreover expressive of bad 
character. Whether or not one accepts the kind of mystical vision of the world as 
being good insofar as it is real that I mentioned at the end of section II, the idea 
that we live in a world full of extraordinarily interesting and worthwhile objects of 
possible inquiry is something that everyone knows at the age of five.  
 
I believe the power of observation in numbers of very young children to be 
quite wonderful for its closeness and accuracy. Indeed, I think that most 
grown men who are remarkable in this respect may… be said not to have lost 
the faculty, than to have acquired it; the rather as I generally observe such 
men retain a certain freshness and gentleness, and capacity of being pleased, 
which are also an inheritance they have preserved from their childhood.58 
 
And even if people tend to forget this truth (as I take it to be) when they are 
older than five, it is still not something that anyone except a skeptical philosopher 
needs to have proved. If someone’s response to the world, overall, is “How boring 
and pathetic”, we don’t think that the speaker is making a no less valid point than 
the person whose response is excitement, curiosity, wonder, love. Instead, we think 
there’s something wrong with him, and probably feel sorry for him because of all 
the wonderful things he’s missing. (Something like this is one part of my own 
reaction to a paper whose “classic” status for most contemporary philosophers I 
must say I have always found rather puzzling, namely “The Makropoulos Case”59. 
To conclude, as Williams does, that in the end boredom is a reasonable and 
appropriate response to reality itself seems to me not only obviously wrong but 
also, well, just terribly sad, really.)  
So much for the “reality might be boring and contemptible” version of the 
objection. I turn to the “reality might be atoms and the void” version.  
                                                 
58 C. DICKENS, David Copperfield, London, Chapman and Hall 1850, Ch.2. 
59 B. WILLIAMS, A critique of utilitarianism, in Utilitarianism: For and Against, with J.J.C. 
Smart, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1973, pp. 83-100. 




Understood this way, the objection asks for metaphysical arguments for the 
existence of the Good, or the Form of the Good, and that request sounds fair 
enough. Plato does offer such arguments, e.g. in the Phaedo and the Republic; so, in 
her own way, does Murdoch, e.g. in Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals. However, the 
request has its own pitfalls. As the request is often made today, it comes against a 
rich background of particular presupposition. (As above, we should always 
disbelieve any philosopher when he says or implies that he makes no 
presuppositions at all; even Plato.) Very often the modern request for a 
metaphysics of the good, fully spelled out, means something like: “Justify these 
moral-realist claims, all the way from the bottom up, against the background of a 
comprehensive desert-landscape physicalism” (perhaps even a Democritean atoms-
and-the-void physicalism). Perhaps that can be done, but it has not, to general 
philosophical satisfaction, been done yet.60 Even if it could be done, a better 
response to this request would be to ask what reason there is, beyond Quinean 
tastes of course, for accepting the physicalist’s desert landscape in the first place. 
Answering this convincingly is a philosophical feat that has not yet been pulled off 
either. I very much doubt it ever could be. 
I suspect that the more we think about the background physicalism that is 
now so pervasively assumed as (at any rate) the default position in philosophical 
metaethics, the more we will come to see the essential weirdness of that view. The 
view that nothing exists except particles, space, and forces gains no support 
whatever from anywhere outside philosophy. In particular, it gains no support at 
all from physics. Physicalism is no more part of a physicist’s background 
assumptions than it is part of a plumber’s background assumptions that plumbing 
is all there is; or part of the theory of chess’s background assumptions that nothing 
exists except chess moves. 
 
How could physics show that reality contains only the kinds of things that 
physics recognizes? It sounds embarrassingly like physics acting as judge and 
jury in its own case. That physics does not show that there is such a thing as a 
debt crisis does not mean that physics shows that there is no such thing as a 
debt crisis: physics simply does not address the question. That is no criticism 
of physics; it has other work to do. For it to turn out that reality contains only 
the kinds of things that hard science recognizes, where they exclude things like 
debt crises, it would have to turn out that a radically reductionist 
metaphysical theory is true. That in turn would require industrial-scale 
                                                 
60 My own (doubtless incomplete) attempt to show that a thorough goingly moral-realist view 
can be vindicated even against the background of a for-the-sake-of-the-argument physicalism is 





argument at a characteristically philosophical level of reasoning. But I doubt 
that [a hard-line physicalist] counts philosophy as hard science.61 
 
Even weirder than the view itself is the use to which physicalists typically 
want to put it in the study of human life. They want to tell us that what we really 
know, what we know about best and first, is the truth (as they take it to be) of 
physicalism; and that since we know that best and first, every other knowledge-
claim is to be subjected to the test of comparison and connection with that 
knowledge. Hence our ordinary experience - and for present purposes, I am of 
course thinking primarily of our ordinary moral experience - must be subjected to 
the test of whether it accords with physicalism. The only thing more extraordinary 
than the bizarre Martianism of this view is the breadth of assent, conscious or 
unconscious, that it now commands in our society. A surer recipe for intellectual 
confusion and alienation would be hard to imagine. And lo and behold, intellectual 
confusion and alienation is exactly what our society has got. 
It is certainly possible, given our plight it may even be necessary, to argue in 
the other direction: to argue not that we cannot talk about experience until we 
have justified such talk at the level of metaphysics, but rather that a metaphysics 
which denies our experience, or which insists on a dislocated Martianism about our 
experience like the physicalist’s, can be seen without further discussion to have 
something seriously wrong with it. And this thought too, or something very like it, 
is already there in Murdoch. For as I have already stressed, she like Plato roots her 
arguments not in a priori logical or metaphysical considerations, but in experience. 
 
Let us start by saying that Shakespeare is the greatest of all artists,62 and let 
our aesthetic grow to be the philosophical justification of this judgment. We 
may note that a similar method can, and in my view should, be used in moral 
philosophy. That is, if a moral philosophy does not give a satisfactory or 
sufficiently rich account of what we unphilosophically know to be goodness, 
then away with it.63 
 
The point that the most plausible arguments we have found for MPVE are in 
this way rooted in the context of some particular experience perhaps serves also, in 
closing, to remind us of something else I have stressed: the importance of 
                                                 
61 Timothy Williamson in the New York Times:  
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/28/on-ducking-challenges-to-naturalism/. 
62 I am not sure how seriously to take this claim. Perhaps Murdoch only means it exempli 
gratia. I hope so, since surely Shakespeare, great as he is, has -at the very least- serious 
competition; from Homer, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Dante, and Tolstoy, for a start. 
63 MURDOCH, Existentialists and Mystics, p. 215. 




understanding the kinds of experience and contemplation that I am talking about 
within the right context and against the right background of affect and 
dispositional preparation. For I can think of plenty of people, and maybe many 
contemporary analytic philosophers would be among them, who might have said to 
Iris Murdoch, as she stared out of her window, “What? What? - It’s only a hawk”. 
If someone did say that - what would he fail to know, what would he be missing? In 
one sense, nothing at all. In another, everything. 
Or as we might also say, the difference here is no more than the difference 
between saying, and not saying, “thank you” for things: 
 
There is at the back of all our lives an abyss of light, more blinding and 
unfathomable than any abyss of darkness; and it is the abyss of actuality, of 
existence, of the fact that things truly are, and that we ourselves are incredibly 
and sometimes almost incredulously real. It is the fundamental fact of being, 
as against not being; it is unthinkable, yet we cannot unthinking it, though we 
may sometimes be unthinking about it; unthinking and especially unthanking. 
For he who has realized this reality knows that it does outweigh, literally to 
infinity, all lesser regrets or arguments for negation, and that under all our 
grumblings there is a subconscious substance of gratitude.64 
                                                 
64 G.K. CHESTERTON, Chaucer, Faber, London 1932, pp. 36-7. 
